def get_path_uid(path):
"""
Return path's uid.
Does not follow symlinks:
https://github.com/pypa/pip/pull/935#discussion_r5307003
Placed this function in compat due to differences on AIX and
Jython, that should eventually go away.
:raises OSError: When path is a symlink or can't be read.
"""
if hasattr(os, 'O_NOFOLLOW'):
fd = os.open(path, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_NOFOLLOW)
file_uid = os.fstat(fd).st_uid
os.close(fd)
else: # AIX and Jython
# WARNING: time of check vulnerability, but best we can do w/o NOFOLLOW
if not os.path.islink(path):
# older versions of Jython don't have `os.fstat`
file_uid = os.stat(path).st_uid
else:
# raise OSError for parity with os.O_NOFOLLOW above
raise OSError(
"%s is a symlink; Will not return uid for symlinks" % path
)
return file_uid
python类O_NOFOLLOW的实例源码
def _secure_open_write(filename, fmode):
# We only want to write to this file, so open it in write only mode
flags = os.O_WRONLY
# os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL will fail if the file already exists, so we only
# will open *new* files.
# We specify this because we want to ensure that the mode we pass is the
# mode of the file.
flags |= os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL
# Do not follow symlinks to prevent someone from making a symlink that
# we follow and insecurely open a cache file.
if hasattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW"):
flags |= os.O_NOFOLLOW
# On Windows we'll mark this file as binary
if hasattr(os, "O_BINARY"):
flags |= os.O_BINARY
# Before we open our file, we want to delete any existing file that is
# there
try:
os.remove(filename)
except (IOError, OSError):
# The file must not exist already, so we can just skip ahead to opening
pass
# Open our file, the use of os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL will ensure that if a
# race condition happens between the os.remove and this line, that an
# error will be raised. Because we utilize a lockfile this should only
# happen if someone is attempting to attack us.
fd = os.open(filename, flags, fmode)
try:
return os.fdopen(fd, "wb")
except:
# An error occurred wrapping our FD in a file object
os.close(fd)
raise
def get_path_uid(path):
"""
Return path's uid.
Does not follow symlinks:
https://github.com/pypa/pip/pull/935#discussion_r5307003
Placed this function in compat due to differences on AIX and
Jython, that should eventually go away.
:raises OSError: When path is a symlink or can't be read.
"""
if hasattr(os, 'O_NOFOLLOW'):
fd = os.open(path, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_NOFOLLOW)
file_uid = os.fstat(fd).st_uid
os.close(fd)
else: # AIX and Jython
# WARNING: time of check vulnerabity, but best we can do w/o NOFOLLOW
if not os.path.islink(path):
# older versions of Jython don't have `os.fstat`
file_uid = os.stat(path).st_uid
else:
# raise OSError for parity with os.O_NOFOLLOW above
raise OSError(
"%s is a symlink; Will not return uid for symlinks" % path
)
return file_uid
def _secure_open_write(filename, fmode):
# We only want to write to this file, so open it in write only mode
flags = os.O_WRONLY
# os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL will fail if the file already exists, so we only
# will open *new* files.
# We specify this because we want to ensure that the mode we pass is the
# mode of the file.
flags |= os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL
# Do not follow symlinks to prevent someone from making a symlink that
# we follow and insecurely open a cache file.
if hasattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW"):
flags |= os.O_NOFOLLOW
# On Windows we'll mark this file as binary
if hasattr(os, "O_BINARY"):
flags |= os.O_BINARY
# Before we open our file, we want to delete any existing file that is
# there
try:
os.remove(filename)
except (IOError, OSError):
# The file must not exist already, so we can just skip ahead to opening
pass
# Open our file, the use of os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL will ensure that if a
# race condition happens between the os.remove and this line, that an
# error will be raised. Because we utilize a lockfile this should only
# happen if someone is attempting to attack us.
fd = os.open(filename, flags, fmode)
try:
return os.fdopen(fd, "wb")
except:
# An error occurred wrapping our FD in a file object
os.close(fd)
raise
def get_path_uid(path):
"""
Return path's uid.
Does not follow symlinks:
https://github.com/pypa/pip/pull/935#discussion_r5307003
Placed this function in compat due to differences on AIX and
Jython, that should eventually go away.
:raises OSError: When path is a symlink or can't be read.
"""
if hasattr(os, 'O_NOFOLLOW'):
fd = os.open(path, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_NOFOLLOW)
file_uid = os.fstat(fd).st_uid
os.close(fd)
else: # AIX and Jython
# WARNING: time of check vulnerability, but best we can do w/o NOFOLLOW
if not os.path.islink(path):
# older versions of Jython don't have `os.fstat`
file_uid = os.stat(path).st_uid
else:
# raise OSError for parity with os.O_NOFOLLOW above
raise OSError(
"%s is a symlink; Will not return uid for symlinks" % path
)
return file_uid
def _secure_open_write(filename, fmode):
# We only want to write to this file, so open it in write only mode
flags = os.O_WRONLY
# os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL will fail if the file already exists, so we only
# will open *new* files.
# We specify this because we want to ensure that the mode we pass is the
# mode of the file.
flags |= os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL
# Do not follow symlinks to prevent someone from making a symlink that
# we follow and insecurely open a cache file.
if hasattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW"):
flags |= os.O_NOFOLLOW
# On Windows we'll mark this file as binary
if hasattr(os, "O_BINARY"):
flags |= os.O_BINARY
# Before we open our file, we want to delete any existing file that is
# there
try:
os.remove(filename)
except (IOError, OSError):
# The file must not exist already, so we can just skip ahead to opening
pass
# Open our file, the use of os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL will ensure that if a
# race condition happens between the os.remove and this line, that an
# error will be raised. Because we utilize a lockfile this should only
# happen if someone is attempting to attack us.
fd = os.open(filename, flags, fmode)
try:
return os.fdopen(fd, "wb")
except:
# An error occurred wrapping our FD in a file object
os.close(fd)
raise
def get_path_uid(path):
"""
Return path's uid.
Does not follow symlinks:
https://github.com/pypa/pip/pull/935#discussion_r5307003
Placed this function in compat due to differences on AIX and
Jython, that should eventually go away.
:raises OSError: When path is a symlink or can't be read.
"""
if hasattr(os, 'O_NOFOLLOW'):
fd = os.open(path, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_NOFOLLOW)
file_uid = os.fstat(fd).st_uid
os.close(fd)
else: # AIX and Jython
# WARNING: time of check vulnerability, but best we can do w/o NOFOLLOW
if not os.path.islink(path):
# older versions of Jython don't have `os.fstat`
file_uid = os.stat(path).st_uid
else:
# raise OSError for parity with os.O_NOFOLLOW above
raise OSError(
"%s is a symlink; Will not return uid for symlinks" % path
)
return file_uid
def _secure_open_write(filename, fmode):
# We only want to write to this file, so open it in write only mode
flags = os.O_WRONLY
# os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL will fail if the file already exists, so we only
# will open *new* files.
# We specify this because we want to ensure that the mode we pass is the
# mode of the file.
flags |= os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL
# Do not follow symlinks to prevent someone from making a symlink that
# we follow and insecurely open a cache file.
if hasattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW"):
flags |= os.O_NOFOLLOW
# On Windows we'll mark this file as binary
if hasattr(os, "O_BINARY"):
flags |= os.O_BINARY
# Before we open our file, we want to delete any existing file that is
# there
try:
os.remove(filename)
except (IOError, OSError):
# The file must not exist already, so we can just skip ahead to opening
pass
# Open our file, the use of os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL will ensure that if a
# race condition happens between the os.remove and this line, that an
# error will be raised. Because we utilize a lockfile this should only
# happen if someone is attempting to attack us.
fd = os.open(filename, flags, fmode)
try:
return os.fdopen(fd, "wb")
except:
# An error occurred wrapping our FD in a file object
os.close(fd)
raise
def get_path_uid(path):
"""
Return path's uid.
Does not follow symlinks:
https://github.com/pypa/pip/pull/935#discussion_r5307003
Placed this function in compat due to differences on AIX and
Jython, that should eventually go away.
:raises OSError: When path is a symlink or can't be read.
"""
if hasattr(os, 'O_NOFOLLOW'):
fd = os.open(path, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_NOFOLLOW)
file_uid = os.fstat(fd).st_uid
os.close(fd)
else: # AIX and Jython
# WARNING: time of check vulnerability, but best we can do w/o NOFOLLOW
if not os.path.islink(path):
# older versions of Jython don't have `os.fstat`
file_uid = os.stat(path).st_uid
else:
# raise OSError for parity with os.O_NOFOLLOW above
raise OSError(
"%s is a symlink; Will not return uid for symlinks" % path
)
return file_uid
def _secure_open_write(filename, fmode):
# We only want to write to this file, so open it in write only mode
flags = os.O_WRONLY
# os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL will fail if the file already exists, so we only
# will open *new* files.
# We specify this because we want to ensure that the mode we pass is the
# mode of the file.
flags |= os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL
# Do not follow symlinks to prevent someone from making a symlink that
# we follow and insecurely open a cache file.
if hasattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW"):
flags |= os.O_NOFOLLOW
# On Windows we'll mark this file as binary
if hasattr(os, "O_BINARY"):
flags |= os.O_BINARY
# Before we open our file, we want to delete any existing file that is
# there
try:
os.remove(filename)
except (IOError, OSError):
# The file must not exist already, so we can just skip ahead to opening
pass
# Open our file, the use of os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL will ensure that if a
# race condition happens between the os.remove and this line, that an
# error will be raised. Because we utilize a lockfile this should only
# happen if someone is attempting to attack us.
fd = os.open(filename, flags, fmode)
try:
return os.fdopen(fd, "wb")
except:
# An error occurred wrapping our FD in a file object
os.close(fd)
raise
def get_path_uid(path):
"""
Return path's uid.
Does not follow symlinks:
https://github.com/pypa/pip/pull/935#discussion_r5307003
Placed this function in compat due to differences on AIX and
Jython, that should eventually go away.
:raises OSError: When path is a symlink or can't be read.
"""
if hasattr(os, 'O_NOFOLLOW'):
fd = os.open(path, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_NOFOLLOW)
file_uid = os.fstat(fd).st_uid
os.close(fd)
else: # AIX and Jython
# WARNING: time of check vulnerability, but best we can do w/o NOFOLLOW
if not os.path.islink(path):
# older versions of Jython don't have `os.fstat`
file_uid = os.stat(path).st_uid
else:
# raise OSError for parity with os.O_NOFOLLOW above
raise OSError(
"%s is a symlink; Will not return uid for symlinks" % path
)
return file_uid
def _secure_open_write(filename, fmode):
# We only want to write to this file, so open it in write only mode
flags = os.O_WRONLY
# os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL will fail if the file already exists, so we only
# will open *new* files.
# We specify this because we want to ensure that the mode we pass is the
# mode of the file.
flags |= os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL
# Do not follow symlinks to prevent someone from making a symlink that
# we follow and insecurely open a cache file.
if hasattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW"):
flags |= os.O_NOFOLLOW
# On Windows we'll mark this file as binary
if hasattr(os, "O_BINARY"):
flags |= os.O_BINARY
# Before we open our file, we want to delete any existing file that is
# there
try:
os.remove(filename)
except (IOError, OSError):
# The file must not exist already, so we can just skip ahead to opening
pass
# Open our file, the use of os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL will ensure that if a
# race condition happens between the os.remove and this line, that an
# error will be raised. Because we utilize a lockfile this should only
# happen if someone is attempting to attack us.
fd = os.open(filename, flags, fmode)
try:
return os.fdopen(fd, "wb")
except:
# An error occurred wrapping our FD in a file object
os.close(fd)
raise
def get_path_uid(path):
"""
Return path's uid.
Does not follow symlinks:
https://github.com/pypa/pip/pull/935#discussion_r5307003
Placed this function in compat due to differences on AIX and
Jython, that should eventually go away.
:raises OSError: When path is a symlink or can't be read.
"""
if hasattr(os, 'O_NOFOLLOW'):
fd = os.open(path, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_NOFOLLOW)
file_uid = os.fstat(fd).st_uid
os.close(fd)
else: # AIX and Jython
# WARNING: time of check vulnerability, but best we can do w/o NOFOLLOW
if not os.path.islink(path):
# older versions of Jython don't have `os.fstat`
file_uid = os.stat(path).st_uid
else:
# raise OSError for parity with os.O_NOFOLLOW above
raise OSError(
"%s is a symlink; Will not return uid for symlinks" % path
)
return file_uid
def _secure_open_write(filename, fmode):
# We only want to write to this file, so open it in write only mode
flags = os.O_WRONLY
# os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL will fail if the file already exists, so we only
# will open *new* files.
# We specify this because we want to ensure that the mode we pass is the
# mode of the file.
flags |= os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL
# Do not follow symlinks to prevent someone from making a symlink that
# we follow and insecurely open a cache file.
if hasattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW"):
flags |= os.O_NOFOLLOW
# On Windows we'll mark this file as binary
if hasattr(os, "O_BINARY"):
flags |= os.O_BINARY
# Before we open our file, we want to delete any existing file that is
# there
try:
os.remove(filename)
except (IOError, OSError):
# The file must not exist already, so we can just skip ahead to opening
pass
# Open our file, the use of os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL will ensure that if a
# race condition happens between the os.remove and this line, that an
# error will be raised. Because we utilize a lockfile this should only
# happen if someone is attempting to attack us.
fd = os.open(filename, flags, fmode)
try:
return os.fdopen(fd, "wb")
except:
# An error occurred wrapping our FD in a file object
os.close(fd)
raise
def get_path_uid(path):
"""
Return path's uid.
Does not follow symlinks:
https://github.com/pypa/pip/pull/935#discussion_r5307003
Placed this function in compat due to differences on AIX and
Jython, that should eventually go away.
:raises OSError: When path is a symlink or can't be read.
"""
if hasattr(os, 'O_NOFOLLOW'):
fd = os.open(path, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_NOFOLLOW)
file_uid = os.fstat(fd).st_uid
os.close(fd)
else: # AIX and Jython
# WARNING: time of check vulnerability, but best we can do w/o NOFOLLOW
if not os.path.islink(path):
# older versions of Jython don't have `os.fstat`
file_uid = os.stat(path).st_uid
else:
# raise OSError for parity with os.O_NOFOLLOW above
raise OSError(
"%s is a symlink; Will not return uid for symlinks" % path
)
return file_uid
def _secure_open_write(filename, fmode):
# We only want to write to this file, so open it in write only mode
flags = os.O_WRONLY
# os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL will fail if the file already exists, so we only
# will open *new* files.
# We specify this because we want to ensure that the mode we pass is the
# mode of the file.
flags |= os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL
# Do not follow symlinks to prevent someone from making a symlink that
# we follow and insecurely open a cache file.
if hasattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW"):
flags |= os.O_NOFOLLOW
# On Windows we'll mark this file as binary
if hasattr(os, "O_BINARY"):
flags |= os.O_BINARY
# Before we open our file, we want to delete any existing file that is
# there
try:
os.remove(filename)
except (IOError, OSError):
# The file must not exist already, so we can just skip ahead to opening
pass
# Open our file, the use of os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL will ensure that if a
# race condition happens between the os.remove and this line, that an
# error will be raised. Because we utilize a lockfile this should only
# happen if someone is attempting to attack us.
fd = os.open(filename, flags, fmode)
try:
return os.fdopen(fd, "wb")
except:
# An error occurred wrapping our FD in a file object
os.close(fd)
raise
def get_path_uid(path):
"""
Return path's uid.
Does not follow symlinks:
https://github.com/pypa/pip/pull/935#discussion_r5307003
Placed this function in compat due to differences on AIX and
Jython, that should eventually go away.
:raises OSError: When path is a symlink or can't be read.
"""
if hasattr(os, 'O_NOFOLLOW'):
fd = os.open(path, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_NOFOLLOW)
file_uid = os.fstat(fd).st_uid
os.close(fd)
else: # AIX and Jython
# WARNING: time of check vulnerability, but best we can do w/o NOFOLLOW
if not os.path.islink(path):
# older versions of Jython don't have `os.fstat`
file_uid = os.stat(path).st_uid
else:
# raise OSError for parity with os.O_NOFOLLOW above
raise OSError(
"%s is a symlink; Will not return uid for symlinks" % path
)
return file_uid
def _secure_open_write(filename, fmode):
# We only want to write to this file, so open it in write only mode
flags = os.O_WRONLY
# os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL will fail if the file already exists, so we only
# will open *new* files.
# We specify this because we want to ensure that the mode we pass is the
# mode of the file.
flags |= os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL
# Do not follow symlinks to prevent someone from making a symlink that
# we follow and insecurely open a cache file.
if hasattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW"):
flags |= os.O_NOFOLLOW
# On Windows we'll mark this file as binary
if hasattr(os, "O_BINARY"):
flags |= os.O_BINARY
# Before we open our file, we want to delete any existing file that is
# there
try:
os.remove(filename)
except (IOError, OSError):
# The file must not exist already, so we can just skip ahead to opening
pass
# Open our file, the use of os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL will ensure that if a
# race condition happens between the os.remove and this line, that an
# error will be raised. Because we utilize a lockfile this should only
# happen if someone is attempting to attack us.
fd = os.open(filename, flags, fmode)
try:
return os.fdopen(fd, "wb")
except:
# An error occurred wrapping our FD in a file object
os.close(fd)
raise
def get_path_uid(path):
"""
Return path's uid.
Does not follow symlinks:
https://github.com/pypa/pip/pull/935#discussion_r5307003
Placed this function in compat due to differences on AIX and
Jython, that should eventually go away.
:raises OSError: When path is a symlink or can't be read.
"""
if hasattr(os, 'O_NOFOLLOW'):
fd = os.open(path, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_NOFOLLOW)
file_uid = os.fstat(fd).st_uid
os.close(fd)
else: # AIX and Jython
# WARNING: time of check vulnerability, but best we can do w/o NOFOLLOW
if not os.path.islink(path):
# older versions of Jython don't have `os.fstat`
file_uid = os.stat(path).st_uid
else:
# raise OSError for parity with os.O_NOFOLLOW above
raise OSError(
"%s is a symlink; Will not return uid for symlinks" % path
)
return file_uid
def _secure_open_write(filename, fmode):
# We only want to write to this file, so open it in write only mode
flags = os.O_WRONLY
# os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL will fail if the file already exists, so we only
# will open *new* files.
# We specify this because we want to ensure that the mode we pass is the
# mode of the file.
flags |= os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL
# Do not follow symlinks to prevent someone from making a symlink that
# we follow and insecurely open a cache file.
if hasattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW"):
flags |= os.O_NOFOLLOW
# On Windows we'll mark this file as binary
if hasattr(os, "O_BINARY"):
flags |= os.O_BINARY
# Before we open our file, we want to delete any existing file that is
# there
try:
os.remove(filename)
except (IOError, OSError):
# The file must not exist already, so we can just skip ahead to opening
pass
# Open our file, the use of os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL will ensure that if a
# race condition happens between the os.remove and this line, that an
# error will be raised. Because we utilize a lockfile this should only
# happen if someone is attempting to attack us.
fd = os.open(filename, flags, fmode)
try:
return os.fdopen(fd, "wb")
except:
# An error occurred wrapping our FD in a file object
os.close(fd)
raise
